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Measuring progress: calculating the life of nations 
 
Ayo Wahlberg 
 
In recent years, sociological examinations of genetics, therapeutic cloning, neuroscience 
and tissue engineering have suggested that ‘life itself’ is currently being transformed 
through technique with profound implications for the ways in which we understand and 
govern ourselves and others. In this paper, I argue that a growing focus on frontier 
technologies in the life sciences in discussions about bio-power today has come at the 
cost of empirical investigations into how, for example, ‘quality of life’ came to be a crucial 
object of bio-power in the 20th century. Just as Foucault outlined the emergence of a 
multiple body – the population – in the 18th century, I suggest, building on work by Rose, 
Rabinow and Hacking, that we can also discern the emergence of a multiple subjectivity – 
state of civilisation, public opinion, human capability, national attitudes, culture – as 
scientific and political problem. If bio-politics deals with the population as a biological 
and political problem, then what we might think of as an anthropo-politics deals with a 
collective subjectivity as a psychological, sociological and/or anthropological problem 
that can be measured, mapped out and intervened upon in much the same way that 
mortality rates, life expectancy or morbidity rates can. By analysing the concrete ways in 
which human progress has been globally measured and taxonomised in the past two 
centuries or so, I will show how global stratifications of countries according to their states 
of ‘civilisation’, ‘development’ and more recently ‘human capability’, have relied not just 
on the population as biological object, but also on a collective subjectivity. Using this 
analysis, I will go on to conclude that the politics of life is in no way limited to biological 
contestations and problems, but equally importantly includes psychological, sociological 
and anthropological problematisations about what a ‘good’, ‘healthy’ or ‘quality’ life is and 
how they might be measured. 
 
Keywords: Bio-power; Foucault; human capability; human progress; life; population; 
quality of life; subjectivity. 
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Introduction 
If global life expectancy and population statistics are anything to go by then it cannot be said that 
‘a modern way of life’ is killing people in any kind of general sense. By most estimates, the vast 
majority of nations have experienced dramatic advances in longevity over the past century or so, 
with a doubling of the global average number of years a newborn can expect to live from about 
30 to 60 and a tripling of the world’s population from about two to six billion. While such 
numbers certainly disregard the impoverished misery of billions,[1] and there is much debate over 
just what factors can be said to account for these advances (public hygiene, modern medicine, 
nutrition, vaccination, urban planning or the treatment of water and sewage), it seems that over 
the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, human life mechanisms came to be worked upon and 
protected in ways that have allowed for increasingly longer living. 
 It was of course Foucault (1978) who suggested that one of the crucial forms modern 
rationalities and practices of government have taken since the 18th century has been a bio-power 
which came to organise the task of administering life, as life and its mechanisms were brought 
into a realm of explicit calculations, the object of expert bodies of anatomical and biological 
knowledge. As such, he argued, it is a power exercised at the level of life, which, on the one hand, 
‘exerts a positive influence on life… endeavour[ing] to administer, optimise, and multiply it, 
subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations’, yet on the other, can be 
‘mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity’ as happened in 
the devastating 20th century holocausts and genocides (Foucault, 1978: 136–7). When Foucault 
suggested that ‘massacres have become vital’ (1978: 137) he was pointing out how the eugenic 
sterilisation, confinement or wiping out of entire sub-populations in the 20th century were often 
wound up in biological and hereditary debates about the ‘quality’ or ‘stock’ of a nation’s 
population. As Rabinow and Rose have put it: ‘racism allows power to subdivide a population 
into subspecies, to designate these in terms of a biological substrate, and to initiate and sustain an 
array of dynamic relations in which the exclusion, incarceration or death of those who are inferior 
can be seen as something that will make life in general healthier and purer’ (2006: 201; see also 
Koch, 2004). And so for all the life advances that have been made possible in the past centuries, 
the bloody effects of bio-power unquestionably stand as one of the most sinister by-products of 
modernity having left a trail of gruesome fatalities in the millions (see Agamben, 1998; Bauman, 
1989; Dean, 1999; Rabinow and Rose, 2006). 
 At the same time, by the latter half of the 20th century, doubts were increasingly being 
voiced as to whether processes of industrialisation, bureaucratisation and rationalisation – 
hitherto so central in the circulation and operation of a disciplinary and regularising bio-power – 
This paper has been accepted for publication in Distinktion, Vol.14: forthcoming 
 
 3
were in fact exerting a purely positive influence on peaceful life. For, notwithstanding measurable 
advances in a range of life indicators (death rates, infant mortality rates, maternal mortality rates, 
life expectancy), it seemed that Mankind’s newfound longevity had come at a cost. In becoming 
mundane, it was argued, modern living had spawned a range of debilitating side effects in the 
form of a dehumanising alienation and an enfeeblement of the body’s biological life mechanisms 
via pollution and toxins. Even if the optimisation of biological processes was allowing people to 
live longer, they were at the same time being zombified into ‘unfeeling spectators of our own 
decaying selves’, left exposed in ‘unbreathable air,... polluted streams’ and a growing chemical ‘sea 
of carcinogens [as]… toxic materials become lodged in all the fatty tissues of the body’, while also 
subjected to the painfully ‘addictive, mutilating and mutagenic’ side effects of modern 
pharmaceuticals (Carson, 1962: 213, 170; Galbraith, 1958: 192, 194; Illich, 1976: 154, 28). In this 
kind of modernisation critique, it was not so much that modern living was killing people off – 
although this argument certainly continues to be put forward in situations where pollutants and 
toxins are directly or indirectly held responsible for human fatalities as well as in terms of a 
looming ecological threat to humanity’s future on this planet; rather, what emerged out of these 
various critiques was a new component of life which it was argued had been hitherto neglected 
by a reductionist and disciplining modernisation: our ‘quality of life’.[2] What such critiques have 
served well to remind us is that there is more to life as a political problem than biology, longevity 
and mortality. 
 There are two important points that I will be arguing in this paper. Firstly, that bio-power 
is not solely a field in which biological contestations and problematisations about life and its 
mechanisms circulate. Late 20th-century developments within the life sciences, especially 
biotechnology, have led a number of social theorists to look at how bio-power is currently being 
refigured by so-called frontier technologies such as genetics, tissue engineering or cloning as they 
remake life itself through technique thus making it ‘artificial’ (see Franklin, Stacey and Lury, 2000; 
Rabinow, 1999; Rabinow and Rose, 2006; Rose, 2001; 2006; Shiva, 1997). It is these attempts to 
engineer life that are seen as generative of bio-value and therefore as drivers of bio-capital 
accumulation in an emergent field of bio-economics. What I will be arguing in the following is 
that we should not forget that not only has bio-power created conditions in which it becomes 
possible to discipline, optimise the capacities of, extort the forces of and more recently enhance 
bodies, it has also allowed for these same tasks to be performed on subjectivities as part of overall 
life-administering interventions. 
 Secondly, by showing how bodies and subjectivities in their aggregate forms have 
manifest themselves in the changing ways that human progress has been empirically measured 
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and taxonomised on a global scale since the 19th century, I will argue that bio-power not only 
concerns mortality rates, life expectancy or birth rates, but also given populations’ states of 
‘civilisation’, ‘development’, ‘human capability’ or ‘quality of life’. In the second part of the paper 
I will show how the evolutionary civilisational population taxonomies (savages, barbarians, 
civilised) of the 19th century were gradually rejected in favour of ‘depoliticised’ developmental 
taxonomies (Third World, Second World, First World) in the early to mid-20th century as the 
sciences of epidemiology, demographics and national accounting were increasingly applied 
globally. Such developmental taxonomies have, in turn, recently been challenged by capability, 
happiness and quality of life taxonomies in the latter half of the 20th century. These changing 
forms of taxonomy, however, should not be seen as gradual shifts away from bio-power, rather 
they should be seen as examples of how transformations resulting from the probing, investigating, 
calculating and mapping out of life at the level of populations have always involved both bodies 
and subjectivities. 
 
Bio-power, bodies and subjectivities 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault famously accounted for what he saw as the swarming of 
anatomo-political disciplinary technologies centred around the individual body during the course 
of the 17th and 18th centuries (1977: 211–28). These were devices used to secure the spatial 
distribution and organisation of bodies through surveillance, training, exercise, bookkeeping, 
reporting and monitoring as a means of extracting and guiding their productive forces. A year 
later, in the final lecture of a course entitled ‘Society Must be Defended’, Foucault suggested that 
‘we see something new emerging in the second half of the eighteenth century: a new technology 
of power… addressed to a multiplicity of men, not to the extent that they are nothing more than 
their individual bodies, but to the extent that they form, on the contrary, a global mass that is 
affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on’ 
(Foucault, 2003: 242–4). What he was pointing out, of course, was the birth of what he would 
later call the second pole of bio-power, a regularising bio-politics characterised not by techniques of 
surveillance and distribution targeted at individual bodies, but by techniques to monitor, modify 
and adjust collective birth rates, fertility rates, national productivity, endemics and death rates. 
 In distinguishing this new regularising bio-politics from a disciplining anatomo-politics, 
Foucault argued that: 
 
what we are dealing with in this new technology of power is not exactly society… 
nor is it the individual-as-body. It is a new body, a multiple body, a body with so 
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many heads that, while they might not be infinite in number, cannot necessarily be 
counted. Bio-politics deals with the population as political problem, as a problem 
that is at once scientific and political, as a biological problem and as power’s problem. 
(2003: 245) 
 
And as has been shown, the sciences of demographics, epidemiology and national accounting 
would take on an increasing importance from this moment onwards in the formulation of public 
hygiene campaigns throughout Europe, ‘civilising’ programmes in the colonies as well as natalist 
policies for influencing birth and fertility rates (Arnold, 1993; Rosen, 1993). As the 19th century 
wore on, a nation’s population became an object in its own right, something to be studied and 
manipulated, its fluctuations and movements to be monitored and controlled in the name of 
human progress. 
 It is this focus on the biological that has been picked up on in recent discussions about 
and empirical investigations of bio-power, bio-politics and bio-capital, no doubt with good 
reason. Both poles of bio-power, Foucault suggested, address the body – as individual anatomical 
machine and as collective biological species. Yet, if anatomo-political disciplinary technologies 
produced docile bodies and bio-political regularising technologies produced malleable 
populations, such bodies and populations were of course never devoid of a subjectivity. Indeed 
disciplinary technologies such as that of the panopticon counted on an individual’s capacities for 
self-reflection and it was exactly with the help of such disciplinary techniques, Foucault argued, 
that the human sciences would eventually emerge as they sought to map out and characterise 
Man’s interiority in a systematised fashion. The methods of punishment, supervision and 
constraint that were developed in the schools, armies, hospitals, factories and prisons of 
bureaucratised, industrialised and colonised societies, contributed in a very real and material sense 
to the making up of the ‘modern soul’;  
 
produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power 
that is exercised on those punished – and, in a more general way, on those one 
supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the 
colonised, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their 
lives. (Foucault, 1977: 29; cf. also Hacking, 2002; Rose, 1999) 
 
However much focus has been directed at the body and the biological in studies of bio-power, it 
is clear that, ever since its emergence, it has relied not just on bodies but also on subjectivities, in 
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both their individual and aggregate forms. What is the point of making such a distinction 
between bodies and subjectivities, especially considering its apparent invoking of a Cartesian 
dualism between a material body and an immaterial mind? The distinction is important because it 
reminds us that there are different objects at stake in the life-administering operations that 
characterise bio-power today. Subjectivity – the modern soul – is an object particular to 
modernity in the sense that since the end of the 18th century, we have seen the emergence of an 
entire plethora of expert bodies of knowledge often clustered together under the headings of 
human and social sciences – psychology, sociology, anthropology, social psychology, etc. – that 
have sought to map out Man’s interiority in terms of languages, faculties, drives, identities, 
attitudes, capabilities, personalities, world views, cultures, lifeworlds or values. It is during the 
course of this governmentalisation of human interiority that the modern soul emerged, an object 
which could be mapped out, measured and monitored over time.[3] However non-corporal, 
subjectivities are certainly not ‘immaterial’ as they have arisen out of a series of concrete 
techniques (e.g. of punishment, healing, educating, ‘civilising’, developing, training, etc.) and of 
social scientific methodologies (e.g. observation, interviewing, opinion surveying, IQ testing, 
questionnaires, self-rating forms, etc.) (see Osborne and Rose, 1999; Rose, 1999). 
 And so, just as Foucault distinguished between an anatomo-politics of the body and a 
bio-politics of the population, a similar distinction might also be made between a psy-politics of 
human subjectivity and an anthropo-politics[4] of collective subjectivity – subjectivity as 
psychological ‘mechanism’ and as sociological/anthropological ‘species’ or ‘kind’. As Rose has 
shown, the psy-sciences have played a central role in the development of ‘new languages for 
speaking about subjectivity, and new techniques for inscribing it, measuring it, and acting upon it’ 
(1999: xxviii). Such psy-political techniques have addressed human interiority as an intimate site 
particular to each individual, yet characterisable in terms of different ‘kinds’ (Hacking, 1995) of 
personalities, identities, drives or capacities and have been generative of a host of techniques of 
subjectification aimed at intervening upon, normalising and/or harnessing individual 
subjectivities. 
 Now, in tandem with the swarming of interrelated anatomo-political techniques of the 
body and psy-political techniques of the modern soul during the course of the 18th, 19th and 
20th centuries (see Foucault, 1977; Rose, 1996b; 1999), we have also seen the emergence of not 
just a multiple body, but also a multiple subjectivity as both scientific and political problem. 
Through a proliferation of ‘civilising’ programmes, awareness-raising campaigns, wartime ‘morale 
propaganda’, cultural revival techniques, capacity-building initiatives and crusades against 
unhealthy lifestyles, what might be thought of as an anthropo-politics came to address a 
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collective subjectivity which could be mapped out in terms of states of civilisation, morale, 
popular beliefs, national attitudes, public understanding, cultural values or human capabilities. If 
bio-politics deals with the population as a biological and political problem, anthropo-politics 
deals with a collective subjectivity as a psychological, sociological and/or anthropological 
problem that can be measured, mapped out and intervened upon in much the same way that 
mortality rates, life expectancy or morbidity rates can. Subjectivities and bodies in their aggregated, 
multiple forms are concurrent targets of the kind of life-optimising interventions that bio-power 
has made possible. As I will show, it is not only life expectancy or infant mortality rates that can 
be measured and manipulated, it is also ‘national human capability’, ‘healthy life expectancy’, 
‘year-on-year increase[s] in awareness’, or the ‘increased number of healthy choices made’ (Great 
Britain Department of Health, 2004: 22, 7; UNDP, 1990; WHO, 2000). 
 Bio-power, Foucault argued, was indispensable to the development of capitalism as it 
allowed for the harnessing, disciplining and optimising of bodies in the service of production – 
‘methods for administering the accumulation of men’ (Foucault, 1977: 220). What I will be 
arguing in the following is that bodies have not been the only object at stake in these 
developments; rather, the harnessing and optimising of subjectivities have been equally important 
components of these methods for administering the accumulation of men. I will now turn my 
attention towards how this broadened conceptualisation of bio-power can be helpful in 
accounting for the many different ways in which human progress has been measured and 
calculated on a global scale in the past few centuries. More specifically, I will argue that 
teleologies of collective maturation, longevity and development have recently been joined, if not 
challenged, by teleologies of collective capability in global endeavours to define and calculate the 
life of nations over time. 
 
‘Civilising the savages’ 
Meticulously measuring, grading and predicting the progress of Mankind has been a consistent 
modern preoccupation since the Enlightenment. It is not that this preoccupation with human 
progress has been particularly unique to modernity, but the different ways in which human 
progress came to be defined and made calculable using particular markers to identify this 
progress over time have certainly been novel. As such, global gradations and rankings of 
civilisations, races and more recently nation states according to their respective stages of progress 
can be found scattered throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. One of the first of such modern 
rankings came at the height of the Enlightenment era, as travellers’ accounts of the ‘savages’ and 
‘barbarians’ of faraway lands poured into Europe. In 1777, Edmund Burke proposed to sketch 
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out a ‘Great Map of Mankind’ which he argued for the first time would allow the status quo 
classification of the world’s various civilisations to double as a general history of the progress of 
Mankind: 
 
We need no longer go to History to trace [human nature] in all its stages and periods. 
History from its comparative youth is but a poor instructour… [N]ow the Great Map 
of Mankind is unrolled at once; and there is no state or Gradation of barbarism, and 
no mode of refinement which we have not at the same instant under our View. The 
very different Civility of Europe and of China; The barbarism of Persia and 
Abyssinia. The erratick manners of Tartary, and of Arabia. The Savage State of 
North America, and of New Zealand. (Burke and Copeland, 1958: 351) 
 
Ever since, such gradations have served as modern templates for human progress, organised by 
what Condorcet (1955) in his 1795 Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind 
argued was an ‘indefinite perfectibility’ of Mankind. In one of the first manifestations of an 
anthropo-politics of a collective subjectivity, nineteenth century civilisation taxonomies were 
dominated by metaphors of a child maturing into an adult, the argument being that ‘child-like’ 
savages were collectively ‘immature’ compared to the ‘rational’ civilised who were considered the 
adults of humanity (see Wahlberg, 2001; 2003). Classification systems which centred around such 
teleologies of maturation ranged from Morgan’s (1877) three statuses of savagery, barbarism and 
civilisation, Comte’s (1974) primitive, metaphysical and positive states of intellectual speculation 
to Spencer’s gradated measurement of the mean capacities of aboriginal Australian, African, 
Malayan and English crania which he argued showed ‘an increase in the course of the advance 
from the savage state to our present phase of civilization’ (1972: 33). The animistic religions, 
‘monosyllabic’ languages, ‘superstitious’ healing rituals and rudimentary tools of the savages were 
all taken as proofs of an immature people who were easily suggestible and rarely capable of ‘deep 
thought’ (Lubbock, 1875: 143). 
 In these first evolutionary civilisation classifications, biological life was considered an 
important enabling factor for human progress inasmuch as the almost exclusively subsistence 
mode of living of the savages left them with little time or need ‘to stimulate the mental capacities, 
and to create the habit of industry – the fertile source of improvements’ (Morgan, 1877: 42). 
Only through a slow process of chance discoveries and inventions could savages improve their 
sustaining skills thereby allowing a gradual transition from a nomadic to a pastoral and eventually 
‘a more sedentary and less strenuous form of life [that] afforded man leisure, [which] in turn 
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favoured the development of the human mind’ (Condorcet, 1955: 19). Such progress, it was 
argued, was indefinite and self-sustaining since it incrementally ‘gives the advantage to the highest 
human faculties, both by the security which sets free our attention from physical wants, and by 
the direct and steady excitement which it administers to the intellectual functions’ (Comte, 1974: 
516). In this way, the stimulated development of the human faculties and a more sedentary life 
could reinforce each other to secure human progress. Although there were fierce debates over 
whether or not a savage could be raised up the civilisation ladder during the course of his or her 
lifetime,[5] there was general agreement that over time a consistent tendency towards 
improvement and perfectibility in accordance with Darwinian, Lamarckian or Spencerian laws of 
evolution prevailed (Wahlberg, 2001). Even Marx and Engels, who gradated societies not in 
terms of their civilisation as such, but rather according to their tribal, primitive, feudal or 
capitalist forms of division of labour and property ownership, argued that as these forms 
developed through this series of teleological stages, a society’s ‘sheep-like or tribal consciousness 
receives… further development and extension through increased productivity, the increase of 
needs, and, what is fundamental to both of these, the increase of population’ (1976: 20). 
 Such overtly evolutionary classifications so common in the 19th century would, of course, 
quickly fall into disrepute in the 20th century. The evolutionary hypothesis that savages were but 
immature and irrational children in the scale of human progress was directly disputed by a new 
kind of anthropological knowledge about ‘primitive cultures’ which based itself on cultural 
immersion, arguing that savages were highly rational and mature people operating in complex 
cultural, theistic, linguistic and intellectual landscapes (Malinowski, 1922; Rivers, 1924). As the 
painstaking and time-consuming ethnographic methods of participant observation, informant 
interviews and overall immersion fieldwork were developed and utilised by anthropologists, a 
new style of reasoning about the ‘savage mind’ emerged: ‘savage man is no illogical or prelogical 
creature, … his actions are guided by reasoning as definite as that we can claim for our own… 
practices’ (Rivers, 1924: 53). For example, concerning the medical practices of the ‘primitives’, 
Ackerknecht would argue that ‘primitive medicine is not a queer collection of errors and 
superstitions, but a number of living units in living cultural patterns, quite able to function 
through the centuries in spite of their fundamental differences from our own pattern’ (1971: 120). 
 
‘Raising the living standards of the poor’ 
This shift, however, did not in any way lead to a cessation of attempts to measure and gradate 
human progress. Instead, the early part of the 20th century saw the cumulative deployment, on a 
global scale, of a whole range of quantifiable and ‘depoliticised’ indicators to allow for the 
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measurement of progress and the classification of nations rather than civilisations, including 
national income, birth and death rates, life expectancy estimations and literacy rates. As bodies of 
demographic, epidemiologic and national accounting knowledge were increasingly applied 
globally in the early part of the 20th century, new models of what eventually came to be known 
as ‘development’ emerged. In these new bio-political taxonomies, stages of civilisation were 
replaced by stages of development which were linked to the average health (as reflected in life 
expectancy estimates and birth/death rates) and wealth (as reflected by national income per 
capita and annual economic growth) of a country’s population. 
 Classifications according to levels of national development have included Thompson’s 
(1929) demographic transition stages, Rostow’s (1960) stages of economic development and 
Omran’s (1971) stages of epidemiologic transition, each of which described how nations moved 
from traditional/pre-industrial to modern/industrial stages of population growth, economic 
development and disease patterns respectively. In setting out a global model of demographic 
transition based on individual nations’ ‘vital statistics’, Thompson suggested that in the very 
poorest countries there will be ‘almost a stationary population dependent upon the harshness of 
the “positive” checks to population growth, viz., disease, hunger, war, etc.’, followed by ‘such 
lands as are developing modern industry and sanitation [where] there is likely to be a very rapid 
increase in [population] numbers during the next few decades… as death-rates [come] under 
control faster than birth-rates’ and finally industrialised countries where there will be ‘very rapidly 
declining birth-rate and death-rate with the former declining more rapidly than the latter so that 
the rate of natural increase is also declining’ (Thompson, 1929: 962). Picking up on this, Omran 
would, some decades later, formulate a ‘theory of the epidemiology of population change’, 
suggesting that all nations went through stages of ‘Pestilence and Famine’, ‘Receding Pandemics’ 
and finally ‘Degenerative and Man-Made Diseases’ as their demographic make up changed and 
life expectancy increased; and as such, they could be ranked accordingly (Omran, 1971). 
 Rostow, on the other hand, looked not so much at the demographics of nations as at 
their productivity and economic growth, arguing in his ‘non-communist manifesto’ that each 
country would have to go through five stages of growth to reach ‘maturity’. Starting from 
‘traditional societies’ where technology was crude and modes of production simple, a country 
would then go through a ‘take off’ stage, a ‘drive to maturity’ and finally an ‘age of high mass-
consumption’ as technology advanced and economies became more complex (Rostow, 1960). 
Importantly, in each of these new gradations of the world’s nation states, it was not so much the 
peoples of the ‘less-developed’ world who were considered primitive or immature, rather it was 
their economies, living conditions and modes of life organisation that were seen as rudimentary, 
This paper has been accepted for publication in Distinktion, Vol.14: forthcoming 
 
 11
traditional or primitive compared to the complex, modern, sanitised and industrialised societies 
of the developed West. Consequently, rates of industrialisation, GNP per capita and economic 
growth became key yardsticks of progress – specifically because they were seen as positively 
correlated to marked decreases in death rates as well as subsequent decreases in birth rates. 
 As Escobar has shown, it was exactly in this post-WWII period that the World Bank 
would set the global poverty line at $100 annual per capita income, thereby transforming ‘two-
thirds of the world’s peoples… into poor subjects’ and eventually allowing for the world’s 
nations to be divided into First, Second and Third Worlds (Escobar, 1994: 23–4). In 1978, one 
hundred years after Morgan’s Ancient Society was published, the World Bank launched yet another 
ranking of the world’s populations according to what it considered to be the most important 
yardstick of development in the 20th century – GNP per capita. In its first World Development 
Report, the World Bank gradated nation states into categories of Industrialized Countries (First 
World), Centrally Planned Economies (Second World) and Middle and Low Income Economies 
(Third World). As predicted by Thompson’s, Omran’s and Rostow’s models, the report 
statistically illustrated how the higher a country’s GNP per capita, the higher its average life 
expectancy and the lower its average annual population growth would be. Although the World 
Bank focused exclusively on economic indicators when measuring progress, it nevertheless 
viewed underdevelopment as nothing short of a bare minimum of subsistence, ‘a condition of life 
so characterized by malnutrition, illiteracy, disease, squalid surroundings, high infant mortality, 
and low life expectancy as to be beneath any reasonable definition of human decency’ (World 
Bank, 1978: iii). 
 To raise a country’s stage of development, the World Bank argued, one would have to 
foster economic growth – via industrialisation and modernisation – such that the optimisation of 
the living conditions of its populations could be secured. In this way, civilisational teleologies of 
maturation could be recast into developmental teleologies of longevity and affluence as progress 
came to be defined as a matter, not of civilising the savages, but rather of ‘raising the living 
standards of the poor’ (World Bank, 1978: iii). While it might seem at first glance that the 
subjectivities of those ‘poor’ who were to be ‘developed’ were completely overlooked in these 
developmental rationalities, the argument was rather that one must first attend to a nation’s ‘basic 
needs’ (clean water, primary health, infrastructure, nutrition) in order to set the stage for a kind of 
‘take off’ into industrialisation which would then generate ‘expansion of education systems, 
growing literacy, improvements in nutrition and health conditions, increasing technological 
sophistication, and structural changes, including a growing industrial base and greater 
urbanization’ (World Bank, 1978: 1).[6] 
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‘Helping people to help themselves’ 
Yet, ironically enough, the launch of the World Bank’s annual reports on the development of 
nations towards the end of the 1970s came at the apex of mid-20th-century modernisation 
critiques which, as mentioned earlier, derided the dehumanising and life-enfeebling effects of 
industrialisation. It is exactly these forms of modernisation critiques that I argue have laid the 
grounds for yet another recasting of the notion of global human progress in recent years. By the 
latter half of the 20th century, critics were arguing that in a world less afflicted by acute hunger 
and sickness than ever before (which of course did not mean that these problems have in any 
way disappeared altogether), progress required more than ‘merely’ securing better living 
conditions and ‘basic needs’ for the ‘poor’. Just as importantly, it also required the formation and 
improvement of the human capabilities of populations and individuals to experience, develop, enjoy, 
and function within the confines of this ‘mere’ subsistence. Reflecting this shift in thinking, the 
UN Development Programme (UNDP) would in 1990 once again propose a new way of 
measuring the progress of nations, arguing that the World Bank’s approach had not sufficiently 
captured the ‘human’ component of progress: 
 
human development is measured in this Report not by the yardstick of income alone 
but by a more comprehensive index – called the human development index – 
reflecting life expectancy, literacy and command over the resources to enjoy a decent 
standard of living… Human development concerns more than the formation of 
human capabilities, such as improved health or knowledge. It also concerns the use 
of these capabilities, be it for work, leisure or political and cultural activities. And if 
the scales of human development fail to balance the formation and use of human 
capabilities, much human potential will be frustrated. (UNDP, 1990: 1) 
 
Rather than classify the world’s nations into categories of First, Second and Third World, the 
UNDP introduced categories of High Human Development, Medium Human Development and 
Low Human Development to gradate the world’s nations. In the resulting re-ranking, the United 
States of America, for example, dropped from 4th most-developed in the world according to 
GNP per capita in 1990 to 19th most-developed according to the new human development index, 
while, in the other direction, Chile jumped from 53rd most-developed to 24th most-developed, 
overtaking the likes of Portugal and Malaysia in the process (UNDP, 1990; World Bank, 1990). 
Although the improvement of living conditions and life expectancy with the help of economic 
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growth clearly remained key objectives in this new model of progress, underdevelopment was 
seen not so much only as a problem of squalid living conditions but rather as one also firmly 
rooted in the subjectivity of the ‘poor’. 
 To explain persisting states of ‘low human development’, ‘underdeveloped’ populations 
in the late 20th century came to be described as demotivated, dependent, unaware, unskilled or as 
lacking a sense of self-esteem and responsibility for their own lives (Wahlberg, 2003). Not that 
(sub-)populations of ‘low human development’ (which, it must be stressed, were said to be found 
in all countries of the world, including those of the industrialised West) were necessarily blamed 
for their unawareness and dependency – indeed many development organisations blamed their 
own past, ‘top-down’ development programmes for having exacerbated the demotivation and 
dependency of the ‘poor’[7] – but their path to progress was nevertheless seen as directly linked 
to the active optimisation of their human capabilities, a task that an expanding range of 
participatory and empowering techniques of development, job seeking, capacity building, 
community participation and cultural resurrection have been addressing since (see Cruikshank, 
1999; Dean, 1999; Rose, 1996a; Triantafillou and Risbjerg Nielsen, 2001; Wahlberg, 2003). As a 
result, alongside developmental teleologies of longevity and affluence, teleologies of human 
capability emerged in which progress was defined as a matter not only of raising the living 
standards of the ‘poor’ but also of ‘helping people to help themselves’. Indeed the latter has 
increasingly come to be seen as requisite to the former in rationalities and practices of human 
development. 
 Ten years after UNDP had suggested a reconfigured way of measuring human progress, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) would follow suit, this time arguing that hitherto average 
life expectancy at birth figures did not necessarily tell the entire story when it came to the state of 
a nation’s health. In their 2000 World Health Report, the WHO launched a new global health 
indicator dubbed the DALE, or Disability-Adjusted Life Expectancy (subsequently renamed 
HALE for Health-Adjusted Life Expectancy), to adjust for ‘time spent in poor health’: 
 
In the old system, we measured a total life expectancy based on the average numbers 
of years males and females could expect to live in each country. However, people 
don’t live all those years in perfect health. At some point in your life, you will have 
some level of disability. These years with disability are weighted according to their 
level of severity to estimate the total equivalent lost years of good health. You subtract 
this from total life expectancy, and what remains is the expected number of years of 
healthy life. (WHO, 2000; my emphasis) 
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It goes without saying that a country’s HALE is always lower than its total average life 
expectancy, implying that there is more to life than ‘mere’ longevity. Extrapolating from global 
HALE and life expectancy statistics, the authors of the WHO World Health Reports suggest that 
‘people living in poor countries not only face lower life expectancies than those in richer 
countries but also live a higher proportion of their lives in poor health’ (Mathers et al., 2004). The 
calculation of a country’s HALE should be understood as a problematisation of disease not only 
in terms of mortality but just as importantly also in terms of morbidity’s effect on a person’s 
quality of life. The argument being that as populations subsist longer and longer, people are more 
prone to morbidity than mortality in a growing proportion of their lives, and as a result may be 
prevented from working or participating in family and social life as well as sometimes left 
dependent on the care of others, all of which are seen as detrimental for a nation’s possibilities 
for progress. And so today, ‘substantial resources are devoted to reducing the incidence of 
conditions that cause ill-health but not death and to reducing their impact on people’s lives’ 
(Mathers et al., 2004), which is to say improving their quality of life. 
 What is striking about these two latest global taxonomies for measuring human progress 
from UNDP and WHO[8] is the novel way in which they once again attempt to factor in 
subjectivity at the level of national populations (the formation and use of human capabilities with 
the HDI and the experience of poor health with the HALE). This is a fundamentally different form 
of anthropo-politics than was characteristic of 19th-century evolutionary debates which 
characterised multiple subjectivities in terms of various stages of ‘maturity’ and civilisation 
grounded in a biological substrate. Measuring collective human capability and quality of life today 
has nothing to do with measuring the mean size of crania of a particular race or peoples, instead 
it involves aggregating demographic literacy, morbidity and school enrolment statistics. 
 In both of these new forms of taxonomy, a recasting of the notion of human progress 
becomes evident: to live is certainly as a minimum to have the means with which to biologically 
subsist, but it is at the same time more than that. It is also to experience and enjoy that life, to 
cope with its vicissitudes (be they seen as bacterial, genetic, viral, toxic, neurochemical, 
psychosomatic, socio-economic, or psychological in origin), to unfold the human capability 
potentials that it makes possible and indeed to be able to function in ways requisite to both a 
lengthy subsistence and a ‘rich’ existence. Biology becomes, in a sense, the ‘cold flesh’ that is to 
be (re)vitalised with ‘quality’ as body and subjectivity remain inseparable, albeit in a novel 
assemblage, in the calculation and measurement of the life of nations. 
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Conclusion 
If the emergence of bio-power can be linked to a kind of governmentalisation of life whereby life 
and its mechanisms have been brought into a realm of explicit calculation in order to optimise 
and administer it, then we will do well to pay attention to the many different ways in which life 
and its mechanisms have come to be conceptualised, mapped out and intervened upon. What I 
have argued in this paper is that a focus on the body and the biological in the bulk of 
contemporary work on questions of bio-power, bio-capital and bio-economics has come at the 
cost of other accounts of what life might be and consequently how it might be improved and 
optimised. Bodies are not the only object of bio-power today, so too are subjectivities or what 
Foucault termed the ‘modern soul’. 
 To be sure, bio-power as a site where novel subjectivities are formed and transformed is a 
thematic that cannot be said to have been neglected in recent years. We have, for example, 
learned how the emergence of a form of biological citizenship has allowed for individuals to 
‘shape their relations with themselves in terms of a knowledge of their somatic individuality’ 
(Rose and Novas, 2005), how the classification of certain human kinds – e.g. the ‘autistic’ who 
suffer ‘from some distinct biological (biochemical or neurochemical) impairment’ – has looping 
effects that can change self-conception and behaviour (Hacking, 1995: 376), how in emerging 
forms of ‘biosociality’ sufferers of certain genetic diseases or conditions are bringing together 
‘medical specialists, laboratories, narratives, traditions, and a heavy panoply of pastoral keepers to 
help them experience, share, intervene, and “understand” their fate’ as well as to ‘demand a say in 
shaping the technologies and forms of knowledge associated with the new genetics’ (Rabinow, 
1996: 102; Novas, 2006: 290), and also how some alcoholics have come to view and act upon 
themselves as ‘endorphin challenged’ in line with cutting-edge neuroscientific research into 
dependency (Vrecko, 2006). 
 The point I have been making, however, is that it would be helpful for us to approach 
individual and collective subjectivities as objects of bio-power (not just as effects) in the same way 
that we can approach the body and the population as objects of bio-power; both of which are 
mapped out, investigated and subject to various forms of normalising and regularising 
intervention, and both of which can in turn have subjectifying or looping effects. In much of the 
contemporary work focusing on the subjectifying effects of the bio-sciences, emphasis has been 
on how the frontier technologies of genetics, neuroscience or stem cell therapy can generate 
novel forms of relating to and acting upon oneself. These frontier technologies rely on the 
harvesting, banking, circulation, cultivation, regulation and/or therapeutic use of certain bio-
materials (stem cells, DNA, neurochemicals) extracted from the body and are made possible by 
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various laboratory techniques of, for example, receptor binding assays, embryonic stem cell 
derivation, DNA sequencing or therapeutic cloning. At the population level, genetic 
epidemiologists measure allele frequency in order to localise susceptibility loci for certain diseases 
and the field of pharmacogenomics has emerged to identify genetic markers with which to 
predict a person’s response to a particular drug under a motto of ‘one size does not fit all’. And, 
as has been empirically demonstrated by the above-mentioned scholars, all of these developments 
have clearly had subjectifying effects as they spill-over or ‘loop’ into an ethical field of self-
understanding and practices of the self. 
 Yet, if, as I have argued, the politics of life is not a domain restricted to the bio-sciences, 
then we must also take into account those technologies and techniques that have been developed 
in the human and social sciences to map out and describe what life is and how it might be 
improved. These technologies and techniques have included participant observation, opinion 
surveys, focus groups, longitudinal social indicator research (e.g. literacy rates, enrolment rates or 
national attitudes) and interviewing. And what they have in common is their attempts to 
circumscribe and make amenable to intervention a certain ‘subjective’ component of life in which 
life is something that is lived, experienced, coped with, taken advantage of and improved in terms 
of ‘quality’, ‘hope’, ‘ontological security’, ‘capability’ or ‘happiness’. These components of life can 
in turn be influenced through ‘therapeutic’ techniques of capacity building, empowerment, 
participation, awareness-raising or coping. In short, in the same way that the life sciences have 
been shown to have looping effects when they classify individuals and populations in a biological 
discursive frame, so too do the human and social sciences when they gradate and taxonomise 
populations and individuals in a psychological, sociological or anthropological discursive frame. 
 Each of the classificatory systems of human progress that I have touched upon in this 
paper – civilisational, developmental and more recently capability-based taxonomies – has 
suggested a particular teleology of progress and each has constituted an attempt at mapping out 
contemporary reality in order to grasp and then intervene upon it. And what is clear from each of 
these systems of classification is that progress has not solely been defined in terms of the 
collective longevity and wealth of populations, but also in terms of these populations’ collective 
states of ‘civilisation’, ‘basic needs’, ‘human capabilities’ or ‘quality of life’, all of which pertain to 
a ‘subjective’ domain of life. 
 And so, just as it has been argued that novel forms of engineering anatomical/biological 
life through regenerative medicine or neuropharmacology are leading to new regimes of bio-
capital and bio-economics, we can also say that novel forms of engineering 
psychological/anthropological life are contributing to the formation of new regimes of human 
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capital and human development. It is in this way that I suggest the concept of bio-power should 
be broadened to take into account both body and subjectivity as objects of life-optimising 
interventions to secure the ‘health, wealth and happiness’ of populations and individuals. As 
Rabinow and Rose have argued, bio-power remains a robust concept when accounting for 
contemporary efforts to map out and propagate life optimisation as it 
 
serves to bring into view a field comprised of more or less rationalized attempts to 
intervene upon the vital characteristics of human existence – human beings, individually 
and collectively, as living creatures who are born, mature, inhabit a body that can be 
trained and augmented, and then sicken and die and as collectivities or populations 
composed of such living beings. (2003: 2–3) 
 
To this field of intervention, however, we should also add a subjectivity that in the same way can 
be trained and augmented, as these human beings and the populations they comprise collectively 
not only subsist, sicken and die but also exist, learn, experience, become ill and cope with their 
afflictions before they die. 
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Notes 
1 For example, a recent UN report noted that life expectancy fell in 34 countries in the last 
decade of the 20th century due to HIV/AIDS, genocide, natural disasters and scandalously 
insufficient health programmes (UNDP, 2003: 2). 
 
2 As already pointed out, I am acutely aware that scandalous health inequalities both within 
nations and globally are neatly overlooked in discussions about progress at the level of 
populations. There are also important questions to be asked concerning what many 
commentators describe as a ‘lack of political will’ to tackle global health problems, the argument 
being that if existing resources were prioritised to address the problems of malaria, HIV/AIDS, 
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tuberculosis, etc. instead of on, for example, military expenditure, then a lot more lives could be 
saved, lengthened and improved. For the purposes of this paper, however, I will be discussing 
health and progress as they relate to aggregated populations on a global scale. 
 
3 This is an important point as one can of course not claim that the problem of the self is 
somehow unique to modernity, any more than one can suggest that taking care of the self by 
attending to some kind of interiority (soul, spirit, mind) is. Very practical and concrete examples 
of self care advice can be found in thousand-year old records (Foucault, 1985). What I am 
arguing is that the ways in which these interiorities came to be known, mapped out, worked upon, 
and harnessed in overall efforts to secure human progress are novel. 
 
4 I realise that as a discipline anthropology spans a wide range of fields of expertise, from 
physical anthropology to archaeology. For the purposes of this paper, I am using the prefix 
anthropo- to indicate that it is a politics that has emerged out of the study of Mankind as a 
collective, or rather, as I will show, as a number of collectives grouped according to ‘race’, 
‘civilisation’, ‘nation’ or ‘culture’, rather than as individuals. 
 
5 Some argued ‘as regards the question of perfectibility of the savage races, it must not be 
forgotten that nature takes no leaps’ (Schoafhauser, 1869: 369) while others pointed to ‘proofs 
that savages are independently able to raise themselves a few steps in the scale of civilisation, and 
have actually thus risen’ (Darwin, 1871: 221). 
 
6 This is not the place to expand on this but it is certainly worth pointing out that this so-called 
‘trickle-down’ model of development espoused by the World Bank, where policy-led structural 
adjustments and a focus on ‘basic needs’ were seen as catalysts for an economic growth which 
would eventually permeate to a nation’s entire population, was highly contested. Proponents of 
structuralist models of development argued instead that modernisation and industrialisation were 
to be secured through interventionist state policies of protectionism as well as through a 
redistribution of global wealth through international aid (see Wahlberg, 2001). 
 
7 For example, the World Bank (1989: 3) has argued that ‘post-independence development 
efforts failed because the strategy was misconceived. Governments made a dash for 
‘modernization’, copying, but not adapting, Western models… This top-down approach 
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demotivated ordinary people, whose energies most needed to be mobilized in the development 
effort.’ 
 
8 It is interesting to note that the development of global indicators for measuring quality of life 
continues. See, for example, Veenhoven for a ‘Happy Life Expectancy’ index which combines 
‘estimates of length-of-life, with survey data on subjective appreciation-of-life… and can be 
interpreted as the number of years the average citizen in a country lives happily at a certain time’ 
(Veenhoven, 1996: 1), the Happy Planet Index which is described as the ‘first ever index to 
combine environmental impact with well-being to measure the environmental efficiency with 
which country by country, people live long and happy lives’ (www.happyplanetindex.org, 
consulted 31 October 2006) and the Economist Intelligence Unit’s ‘“quality of life” index based 
on a unique methodology that links the results of subjective life-satisfaction surveys to the 
objective determinants of quality of life across countries’ (www.economist.com, consulted 31 
October 2006). 
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